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Abstract
Current practice for combating cyber attacks typically use Intrusion Detection Sensors
(JJDSs) to passively detect and block multi-stage attacks. This work leverages Level-2 fu
sion that correlates IDS alerts belonging to the same attacker, and proposes a threat assess
ment algorithm to predict potential future attacker actions. The algorithm, TANDI, reduces
the problem complexity by separating the models of the attacker's capability and opportu
nity, and fuse the two to determine the attacker's intent. Unlike traditional Bayesian-based
approaches, which require assigning a large number of edge probabilities, the proposed
Level-3 fusion procedure uses only 4 parameters. TANDI has been implemented and tested
with randomly created attack sequences. The results demonstrate that TANDI predicts fu
ture attack actions accurately as long as the attack is not part of a coordinated attack and
contains no insider threats. In the presence of abnormal attack events, TANDI will alarm
the network analyst for further analysis. The attempt to evaluate a threat assessment algo
rithm via simulation is the first in the literature, and shall open up a new avenue in the area
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Glossary
alert An IDS alert or system log message., p. 1 .
attack A sequence of IDS alerts or system log messages that have been grouped to
gether to represent a single cyber attack., p. 20.
attributes Fields contained within an Event, such as Signature, Target UP, or Source IP,
p. 20.
compromised entity An entity that has been overtaken or stolen by the hacker., p. 20.
E
entity A piece of information or data that can be compromised by the hacker. These
can include: existence of computers, user accounts and critical data., p. 20.
event Any IDS alert or system log message that represents something that occurred
on the network., p. 20.
impact assessment The act of determining the consequences of a situation., p. 8.
xi
Information Graph A directed graph that represents logical inferencing such that each
node represents an entity on a network., p. 21.
Sequence Graph A directed graph that represents logical inferencing such that each
node represents attributes of an event., p. 21.
Situation The current state of an environment., p. 8.
threat a situation that could lead to unauthorized access, impairment of network op
erations, or a loss of data integrity., p. 21.
threat assessment The act of projecting a current situation into the future to deter




This work develops a new threat assessment framework for cyber attacks that have been
detected on a computer network. This framework is known as TANDI: Threat Assessment
ofNetworkData and Information. In addition to developing a threat assessment framework,
it also presents a framework for evaluating threat assessment methods.
Computer networks use intrusion detection sensors (IDS's) to monitor network traffic
for suspicious activities. If any such activity is detected, an IDS generates an appropriate
alert. These alerts vary by the IDS used, but typically include reconnaissance actions (such
as
"ping"
or a port scan) and intrusion attempts (such as logon failures or service exploits).
Since cyber attacks typically occur inmultiple stages overmultiple machines [14], an ideal
computer security tool should be able to correlate multiple alerts generated by the same cy
ber attack and assess the threat associated with each attack. However, the popular tools in
use today are unable to correlate IDS alerts to detectmulti-stage multi-machine attacks and
cannot therefore assess the threat of such an attack. These tools typically assess the threat
based on the alerts generated for one machine or subnet. This method, however, is not com
prehensive enough, because the alerts generated for one machine may not all be correlated
to the same attack or may just be normal network traffic. Also, since most cyber attacks
occur over more than one machine or subnet, the significance of an attack cannot be deter
mined without correlating alerts generated for different computers. For large networks, this
is a severe limitation. These networks are usually segmented by a firewall. Servers outside
of the firewall are vulnerable to direct attack from an Internet computer, whereas comput
ers internal to the firewall are not. Therefore, an external hacker must first attack a server
outside the firewall. If this server is compromised, the hacker could use it as a stepping
stone to compromise other computers on the network. Since the hacker may be unaware of
the location of critical information, multiple computers will likely be attacked before the
hacker actually compromises the desired information. Research and development efforts
are currently in place to correlate alerts due to multi-stage multi-machine cyber attacks;
however, these tools lack threat assessment. In other words, they are able to detect and
distinguish incoming cyber attacks, but are unable to rank them based on the threat posed
to the network or network entities. One such tool that lacks threat assessment but is able
to detect incoming cyber attacks is INFERD, which has been developed and currently in
revision [28]. Much of the existing work on INFERD was leveraged for the development
of TANDI.






















Figure 1.1: Flow diagram
This work develops a novel threat assessment framework formulti-stage multi-machine
cyber attacks. It is developed with the assumption that a lower-level alert correlator has al
ready detected one or more cyber attacks. This framework was then simulated in lava using
semi-randomly generated data that would be consistent with the output of an alert corre
lator such as INFERD [28]. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the threat assessment algorithm is
built as an additional processing unit of a cyber attack detection system. The threat assess
ment algorithm takes the correlated alerts, basic computer and network configurations, and
topology as inputs. It outputs numerical values, known as the threat score representing the
threat levels of different entities that have not yet been compromised by incoming cyber
attacks. An entity in this application is something that is present logically or physically in
the network, such as a user account, existence of computers and data.
The developed frameworkwas simulated using Java. Since there is limited cyber attack
data available to the public [30], attack data was generated semi-randomly that was consis
tent with actual cyber attacks that would occur on the simulated networks. The framework
was simulated over multiple networks varying in size and connectivity.
The second contribution is a set of general threat assessment metrics that can be used
to analyze different threat assessment frameworks against each other using the same data.
These metrics, such as average normalized compromising score, percent false positives,
and percent false negatives, provide the analyst with values to determine the accuracy of
the past threat assessment. These metrics can be used to modify parameters or models in
the threat assessment framework. Other metrics were developed that provide the analyst a
means in which to rank attacks against each other.
1.1 Cyber Attacks: The Execution and Detection
Before developing a cyber attack threat assessment framework, one must first have a basic
understanding of how a hacker can attack a computer network. In addition, one must also
understand the process by which a network analyst typically goes through to detect cyber
attacks.
A good example of a cyber attack on a Windows network can be found in [14]. The
example, albeit simple, provides a good illustration of how a typical cyber attack may tran
spire. Note that the term
"typical"
is used loosely here as there are potentially an infinite
number ofways a computer can be compromised. In this example, a hacker first discovers
the IP addresses of a fake organization's computers that are external to the firewall. The
hacker is also able to scan the open ports of each computer as well as query these com
puters for the versions of software currently running. This procedure, known as network
footprinting, allows the hacker to plan his first attack on the network and is usually exe
cuted by scripting. Based on information obtained through footprinting, the hacker decides
to perform SQL injection on the web server to gain access to a book ordering page. SQL
injection is an exploit performed on servers that do not validate usernames before query





the usemame, which, when executed as part of an SQL query, will return all results thus
allowing the user to be authenticated by the SQL server. The hacker is then able to gain
root privileges on the SQL server by uploading a script via TFTP (which is installed on
all Windows machines by default) to the SQL server that grants the hacker administrative
privileges. Now the hacker can download a user list with encrypted passwords. The hacker
then runs an offline script that decrypts the passwords. The hacker then tries to login with
the usernames and passwords on the data center computer until one works, which then
allows him to penetrate the firewall.
While the attack presented above is now unlikely since most networks are not vulner
able to the SQL injection query anymore [14], it does provide a basic understanding of
how a hacker needs to attack and compromise a network, which involves: reconnaissance,
intrusion, privilege escalation, and data transfer. Note that, some hackers blindly execute
service exploits before ever discovering which hosts actually exist. This is typically accom
plished by a script that sends the malicious traffic to a predefined set of IP addresses and
TCP ports. Also, some exploits, such as the RPC DCOM attack [20], immediately grant
system level privileges on the victim computer, so privilege escalation is accomplished at
the same time as intrusion. Since new exploits are being discovered and patched everyday,
cyber attacks are constantly changing and evolving.
In combating cyber attacks, network administrators or security analysts (who will be
referred to as network analysts) must constantly monitor the network for any abnormalities
in network traffic and performance to detect and avert incoming attacks. Network ana
lysts typically place IDS sensors such as Snort [27], Dragon [8], and DaiWatch [3] in the
network to analyze and report anomalous traffic. In addition to the IDSs, system logs on
important machines are also usually configured to report any logon failures or suspicious
activity. These IDS alerts and log messages are typically organized in a spreadsheet or
database format that must be manually analyzed by the network analyst. Tools such as
Cisco System's netForensics [12] aggregate these alerts into a spreadsheet format for the
network analyst. Based on the reported alerts, netForensics classifies alerts on a scale of 1
to 5, with 5 being the most severe. It calculates the threat level on machines being attacked
based on the number and severity level of alerts using the following equation:
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where n is the severity of the alert. This calculation is also calculated for machines that
are performing the attack. The threat score defined by Cisco is basically a weight count of
alerts detected for each machine.
The risk factor is then calculated for each of the organizations computers using the
following equation:
Risk Score = Threat Score * Popularity * System Value * Exposure (1.2)
where Popularity, System Value, and Exposure are assigned by the network analyst with
the following definitions:
Popularity indicates how often a machine might be attacked.
System Value indicates the importance of the assets associated with the computer.
Exposure is based on the OS and number of network services running on the ma
chine. This value is indicative of the likelihood that the machine could be attacked.
For example, a server with 10 services running should have a higher exposure value
than a server with 5 services running since there are more potential vulnerabilities in
the server running 10 services.
The Cisco threat assessment technique is very limited. This technique provides an interface
for the network analyst to define manually. It only correlates the alerts on a by machine
basis. Since cyber attacks usually progress over multiple machines, a network analyst must
manually correlate alerts occuring on different computers to get an indication of what at
tacks a hacker has executed on the network. It can easily be seen that a multi-computer
cyber attack detection scheme can drastically improve the efficiency of analyzing poten
tially malicious traffic.
Cisco Systems has also recently released a security program called Cisco SecurityMon
itoring, Analysis, and Response System, or Cisco MARS for short [29]. While Cisco
MARS does illustrate an 'Attack Path', the product literature suggests that this attack path
is merely the path of a single malicious network packet. Cisco MARS provides the analyst
with a spreadsheet-based output of the alerts for malicious traffic (shown in Figure 1
.2)
as
well as a plethora of graphs for trend analysis. However, like netForensics, Cisco MARS
does not seem to have the ability to correlate alerts across multiple machines to form a
complete attack from a single source.
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Figure 1.2: Cisco MARS Screenshot
In spite of their short comings, Cisco netForensics and MARS seem to be the only
commercially available tools that attempt to assess the threat on a computer network. It is
highly likely that some companies have developed their own software to assess the threat
on their network. However, if a commercial tool was developed, companies could save the
time developing an in-house tool by just purchasing and configuring the commercial tool.
Despite the drawbacks ofCisco netForensics andMARS, the amount of data could still
be manageable for a small network. However, such a system operating on an enterprise
network could lead to information overload for the network analyst. Recent research based
on data fusion, such as INFERD [28], has focused on automatically correlating alerts into
separate independent attacks. INFERD creates dynamic objects known as "attack
tracks"
each of which represent a single attack. An attack consists of alerts generated for multi
ple computers providing the analyst with multi-machine cyber attacks. However, INFERD
(and other such systems) lack a tool to predict what could possibly happen next. This pre
dictionwould allow the analyst to quickly assess which attacks are able to next compromise
critical data or information on the network.
1.2 Threat Assessment as a Data Fusion Problem
A multisensor network is a network set up with many different types of sensors to monitor
the environment or detect anomalies. The raw sensed data often has no meaningful inter
pretation. However, the data can be combined to provide a better view of the situation or the
status of the environment. The process of combining the data into meaningful information
is known as data fusion.
Data fusion is formally defined by the Joint Director's Laboratory (JDL) [32] as
A multilevel, multifaceted process dealing with the automatic detection, asso
ciation, correlation, estimation, and combination ofdata and informationfrom
single and multiple sources.
JDL defined 5 levels of processing in a data fusion system as summarized below [9] .
Level 0 processing involves how the sensors obtain readings and also refines the signal
obtained by the physical sensor. This is typically a signal processing problem.
Level 1 processing is known as object refinement. This level correlates the sensed data
to identify and classify an entity. For example, a multisensor network may be set up to
detect enemymissiles. Level 1 processing combines the data from the sensors to determine
if the detected object is an enemy missile.
Level 2 processing is known as situation refinement. It can also be called situation as
sessment. This level further refines the level 1 information by trying to determine attributes
associated with each detected entity. Using the missile detection example, level 2 fusion
might use temporal and spatial correlations to determine the direction and the speed of the
missile.
Level 3 processing is known as threat refinement. It can also be called impact assess
ment or threat assessment. While most literature use impact assessment and threat assess
ment interchangeably, this work distinguishes between the two. Threat assessment is the
process of projecting a current situation into the future. Impact assessment is the process
of determining the potential consequences of a particular situation. This work focuses on
threat assessment to aid in impact assessment. If level 2 fusion determined that a missile
was moving towards an ally camp that was ten miles away, level 3 fusion would identify
the missile as being a high threat to the ally camp.
Level 4 processing is known as process refinement. This attempts to reposition sensors
or adjust sensor capabilities to gain a better view of the situation. It also attempts to au
tomatically react to the current situation [9]. While this level was originally included in
the data fusion model, recent works have suggested that this level should not be included
because it is decision and reaction but not data fusion [19].
Many computer networks are set up with intrusion detection sensors (IDSs) thatmonitor
network traffic and generate alerts when suspicious behavior occurs on a computer network.
For example, an IDS would generate an alert for an ICMP message from an external IP
address since that could be a signal that a hacker is trying to determine what machines on
the network are available (Levels 0 and 1). These alerts can be correlated based on the
source and destination IP addressess (along with other parameters) to group alerts as part
of a specific attack (Level 2). The set of correlated alerts can then be analyzed to assess
the threat of the attack and predict what could happen (Level 3). So it can be seen that
cyber attack detection can be a data fusion system [4]. One such tool that is still under
refinement is INFERD which uses data fusion as the basis for the detection of cyber attacks
[28]. INFERD currently only supports level 1 and level 2 fusion.
Little, et al. suggest that a threat assessment framework should be able to encompass
capability, opportunity, and intent [17]. The capability of the attacker is determined on the
education of the attacker in the domain and the tools he is able to use to execute the attack.
Opportunity is determined by the current situation dictates what the attacker is able to do.
Intent is simply the reason or motivation for the attack.
1.3 Statistical Methods for Threat Assessment
The authors of [2] suggest the use ofBayesian Networks (BNs) andHiddenMarkovModels
(HMMs) for threat assessment. This section describes how BNs and HMMs could be used
to implement a threat assessment algorithm.
1.3.1 Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph in which the nodes represent random vari
ables and the edges signify conditional dependencies between the pairs of nodes. A set
of posterior probabilities, P, for each node is also needed. Formally, let X = X\, ...,Xn
denote a set of random variables that correspond to one node in the Bayesian graph. Then
P = {Pi} where Pi = P(Xj|Pa.), Pa; is the set of predecessors for node Xi [13, 18].
If each node represents an event that could occur and each edge is assigned a transition
probability, Pe, the above definition for Pi should be changed to Pi = P(X;|P*), where
P*
is the set of incoming edge probabilities from only the predecessor nodes that have already
been asserted. A node is considered to be asserted when the event it represents occurs. In
other words, if a transition probability is assigned as a weight to each edge in the graph,
then Pi is the joint probability of the transition probabilities from predecessor events that
have already occurred.
In terms of threat assessment, Bayesian networks can be used to predict upcoming
events. If one defines the nodes such that each node represents an event and the edges
such that the source event can directly precede the destination event, P, = P(Xi\P*e)
indicates the probability that Xi occurred based on past events given the probabilities that
the predecessors ofX, have occurred. If one assumes that event Xi can be detected when
it occurs, this probability corresponds to the likelihood that Xi will occur.
Bayesian networks can be applied to cyber attacks by defining a course of action in
which the hacker can penetrate the network. This course of action could be defined by the
types of attacks the hacker could perform or the information the hacker has compromised
during the attack. Phillips and Swiler suggest that this course of action can be generated
based on the topology of the network, the services and configurations running on each
machine, user groups, attacker profile and other network characteristics [23], Each edge is
assigned a probability that represents the probability of success. These edge probabilities
can be used to compute the most likely path of the attacker. This can be determined using a
shortest path algorithm. For this to work, the negative logarithm (log) of each probability
can be used as an edge weight so that the summation of the edge weights is equivalent to the
product of the corresponding probabilities. For very large networks, this attack graph can
become very large and unwieldy. So the authors suggest ideas to increase the scalability
-
such as building blocks used to automatically create portions of the course of action.
Liu and Man [18] also develop a Bayesian vulnerability assessment technique. They
use an attack graph similar to that ofPhillips and Swiler, however, only root privileges, user
privileges, and basic topology are used to construct the graph. An example attack graph
Liu and Man use is shown in Figure 1.3. It illustrates that a hacker must first obtain user
or root privileges to computer ipO before gaining privileges to computer ipl. The rest of
the attack graph is similarly structured. One limitation of this implementation is that the
graph must be acyclic. So, for example, if it is possible for a hacker to gain root access to
ip3, then compromise ip2, a new attack graph must be created. Since most networks have
a very dense connectivity this would yield a large number of attack graphs that need to be
10
Figure 1.3: Example Attack Graph of Four Computers as used in [18]
analyzed.
Liu and Man assume that only privileges are needed to assess network vulnerability.
While the intent of their paper was not threat assessment, this idea can be extended to
threat assessment. Since different privileges allow access to different files, some privileges
(such as network administrator) are more important to the integrity of the network. Differ
ent privileges typically allow different levels of access to the information and data on the
network. If a hacker has gained low level privileges, such as a guest account, the critical
data has not yet been compromised. So while illegal guest access to the computer should
be removed as soon as possible, the situation is not in a high threat situation. The threat
assessment algorithm proposed in this work distinguishes between the different privileges.
11
1.3.2 Hidden Markov Models
A HiddenMarkov Model (HMM) is a finite set of states. Each of these states is associated
with a probability distribution. State transitions are defined by a set of probabilites called
transition probabilities. An observation is generated according to the assocated probability
distribution in a state. A state is considered
"hidden"
because only its observation is visible
to the outside, not the state itself.
Three assumptions are made in HMM theory. First, the next state is dependent only
on the current state. Mathematically, this is shown in (1.3) where a^ is the transition
probability from state i to state j, P denotes probability and qt is the state at time t. This is
different from a BN in that a current state in a BN may be dependent on more than one of
the previous states. Therefore, an HMM is a special case of a BN.
a^
= P{qt+i = j\qt = i} (L3)
The second assumption is that the transition probabilities do not change with time. The
final assumption is that the current observation is statistically independent of the previous
observations [24, 33].
While there is currently no literature supporting the use of HMM's for cyber attack
threat assessment, HMM's have been used in other domains for threat assessment. The
authors of [1, 25, 2] use HMM's to detect, track, and predict terrorist activities. In their
models, a specific sequence of events corresponds to each state. Given the actual detected
sequence of events, they perform a graph matching algorithm that identifies the most likely
current state of the HMM. Figure 1.4 illustrates the connection between the HMM and
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Figure 1.4: Connection between HMM and GraphMatching in [1]
1.3.3 Viability of Statistical or Probabilistic Techniques in the Cyber
Domain
While the above Bayesian-based approaches are comprehensive ideas, it may not be real
istic for large and complex enterprise networks if no aggregation of nodes is used. Even if
the course of action can be generated for such a network, assigning the probabilities is not
a trivial task. The probabilities could be assigned in three ways.
First, one or more subject matter experts (SMEs) could assign the probabilities man
ually [2]. However, with a large number of nodes, this could be a very time consuming
and potentially inaccurate and high-maintenance task. Even if the SMEs are able to assign
probabilities, there is a high likelihood that the probabilities will have a wide variance, thus
making them unreliable.
The second way to assign the probabilities is by training based on historical data sets
[2, 33, 7]. Unfortunately, the non-stationary nature of cyber attacks, i.e., old attacks will
soon be obsolete and new attacks are being invented every day, presents a fundamental flaw
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to this approach. The historical data set may never be representative for the future courses
of action. However, a more limiting factor to training the probabilities is the lack of data
itself [30].
The third approach is simply a combination of the first two. These observations suggest
that, while the Bayesian network, at first glance, seems to be a good technique to assess
threats in the cyber domain, the assignment of probabilities makes it not a viable choice.
1.4 Threat Assessment Algorithm Design Considerations
While much research has been conducted in terms of detecting cyber attacks [33, 28],
little research has involved assessing the impact of a cyber attack. According to [30], the
reason is because of the lack of cyber security data. Many companies will not release cyber
security data publicly because of liability, loss of reputation, and competition issues. This
leads to a great challenge for advancing impact assessment of cyber attacks, because any
techniques that are developed cannot be compared against each other using a common set
of data benchmarks. It is also currently unclear how to assess the accuracy or precision of
a threat assessment algorithm. This potentially limits the credibility of a proposed impact
or threat assessment algorithm for cyber attacks. This is one of themajor roadblocks in the
development of cyber security systems.
Salerno, et al, introduces techniques to evaluate situational awareness of data fusion
systems [26] . This paper focuses on level 2 and lower data fusion but does not directly
address level 3.
Kang andMayfield propose a set of questions in [15] that should be answered in the
analysis of a threat assessment algorithm for cyber attacks. Some of the important questions
are:
Can it predict attack timeline, direction, and the potential impact of the attack?
Can it differentiate between the main attack and decoys?
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How precise and accurate is the algorithm?
Does it generate easy to understand reports?
Despite this set of proposed questions, there are currently no common performance
metrics for a threat assessment algorithm. So in addition to developing the algorithm, this
work will also propose performance metrics used to evaluate such an algorithm.
1.5 Vulnerability vs. Threat Assessment
As previously mentioned, threat assessment projects an attack into the future to determine
potential consequences of an attack. This work will try to determine what the hacker is
attempting to do and identify the consequences of the attack. Vulnerability assessment
identifies vulnerabilities before a system is implemented or attacked to determine how se
cure the system is. These vulnerability assessment techniques, however, can be used during
system operation to project what could happen in the future. So while threat assessment and
vulnerability assessment are different, ideas and techniques originating from vulnerability
assessment can be used for threat assessment.
Impact and threat assessment are both considered to be part of level 3 of the JDL data
fusion model [9]. One interpretation to distinguish impact assessment from threat assess
ment can be as follows. Impact assessment is the process of determining the consequence
of an attack. Threat assessment models should take three variables into account - capabil
ity, opportunity, and intent [17] to predict the future actions of an attacker. Each of these
variables can be used in conjunction with each other to determine what the attacker is able
to do, what the attack can do, and what the attacker plans to do.
The authors of [23] set forth a definition such that an ideal network vulnerability anal
ysis should entail the following:
Ideally, a network-vulnerability risk-analysis system should be able to model
the dynamic aspects of the network (e.g. virtual topology changing), multiple
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levels ofattacker ability, multiple simultaneous events ormultiple attacks,
user
access controls, and time-dependent, ordered sequences ofattacks.
This definition implies what a cyber attack impact and threat assessment algorithm
should include.
Changwen and You [6] use a decision making matrix to determine the threat of en
emy vehicles and missiles in a military application. Their technique incorporates multiple
attributes such as altitude, velocity, and attack angle. Fuzzy membership functions are de
fined to calculate the overall threat. These membership functions must be manually created,
andmay not be suitable in the cyber domain where unknown attacks are possible and being
invented every day.
Vidalis and Jones [31] use vulnerability trees to model attacks where the root of the tree
is the goal of the attack and the child nodes define a course of action. The possible exploita
tion of each vulnerability is modeled by the educational complexity of the attacker, which
measures how advanced the attacker must be to exploit the vulnerability. This procedure
may not be feasible for systems that have a large number of goals. A different feature tree
must be developed for each goal, so the generation of these feature trees for a large number
of goals could be potentially tedious and error-prone.
1.6 Summary of Contributions
1.6.1 TANDI: Threat Assessment ofNetwork Data and Information
Themain contribution of this work is the development of a novel cyber attack threat assess
ment framework named Threat Assessment of Network Data and Information (TANDI).
TANDI is actually a combination of level 2 (situation assessment) and level 3 (threat as
sessment) data fusion. Besides being the first of its kind, the novelty of TANDI lies in
the separation of how (Potential Attack Sequence), where (Logical Topology), and what
(Information Graph) the hacker can attack. These three directed graphs can be developed
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independent of each other and are fused together to determine critical network entities
that have been compromised, which is situation assessment. Based on this result,
TANDI
will then try to predict the next critical entity that will be compromised by combining a
fixed number of weights assigned to nodes in each of the three graphs. These weights are
assigned based on what has already happened, and what is likely to happen next. The eval
uation of a feature tree underlying each node in the information graph yields a
threat score,
which corresponds to the threat to the entity being compromised next. This prediction is re
ferred to as threat assessment. While only one feature tree structure was used in this work,
the structure could easily be changed to provide a different (and potentially more accurate)
evaluation of the weights. The separation of how, where, and what and the feature tree
make TANDI a flexible and scalable framework. Results also indicate that TANDI can be
potentially used to detect coordinated attacks.
1.6.2 Threat Assessment Framework Simulation and Analysis
The second contribution involves the evaluation of the performance of a threat assessment
framework. While there exist threat assessment frameworks in domains other than com
puter networks, there is no common way to evaluate frameworks against each other. This
work provides several common metrics, such as average normalized compromising score,
percentfalse positives, andpercentfalse negatives that can be used to compare frameworks
over the same set of data. Other metrics, such as percent threatened, can also be used to
evaluate the overall threat of an incoming attack. The use of these metrics is illustrated by




TANDI: Threat Assessment ofNetwork
Data and Information
This chapter discusses the framework and implementation of Threat Assessment of Net
work Data and Information (TANDI). Section 2.1 discusses an analysis of the supporting
work to identify key ideas that TANDI should implement. The basic framework is then
illustrated in Section 2.3 and followed by a discussion of the generalization and implemen
tation of TANDI.
2.1 Preliminary Design of a Threat Assessment Frame
work
To assess the threat of a cyber attack, one must first define what a threat is. This work will
define threat in a cyber attack context as a situation that could lead to unauthorized access,
impairment of network operations, or a loss of data integrity. An entity is considered to be
compromised if it has been overtaken by the attacker.
To determine the threat on a network, one can consider the six basic questions that can
be used to describe a situation: How, Where, When, What, Why, and Who. Among them,
the IDS alerts provide information to indicate (or at least imply) the how: the methods the
attackers used to penetrate the network, the where: the machines or subnets compromised
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(or attempted to be compromised) by the attackers, and the when: the time the attacks took
place. The what is defined, in this work, as the network data and information, such as the
existence of a machine, the root privilege, or Oracle database, the attackers may target on
in each stage of the attack. The determination of the why and the who may require forensic
analysis by experts and is out of the scope of this work. Note that the when can be indicative
to the attacker's behavior and used to project the time of the next attack. However, there is
no consensus yet among subject matter experts (SMEs) on how to use such information.
Since Bayesian networks (BNs) require the assignment of a large number of probabil
ities, the use of a BN is not viable for a cyber attack threat assessment. The assignment
of probabilities can be avoided by the use of logical inferencing. Logical inferencing is
simply "if A then possibly B". For example, if it is found that a hacker has compromised
a user account, then accessing the critical files associated with that user is considered to
be a logical next step in the attack. However, there are many possible ways a hacker can
take to compromise the same entity, therefore it is desirable ifmany attacks with the same
intent are aggregated together. This is a valid assumption, because, for the sake of threat
assessment, what could happen next is more important that the attack itself.
Network-specific knowledge is needed for accurate threat assessment. Computer net
works vary widely in size and purpose, so are therefore vulnerable to some different ex
ploits. This knowledge allows a threat assessment framework to filter out any false posi
tives. For example, consider two networks, each of which contains a server running Win
dows Server 2003, where only one of them is patched against the RPC DCOM attack. The
RPC DCOM attack exploits a buffer overflow in the Remote Desktop service that allows a
hacker to obtain a system-level command prompt remotely [20]. If an IDS detects the RPC
DCOM attack, the server on the patched network should not be compromised, since it is
not vulnerable to the attack and the alert is a false positive. However, the unpatched server
should be considered compromised. Now that the unpatched server is compromised, that
server could then be used to compromise the patched server. Accurate threat assessment
also requires knowledge of network topology. If a compromised server has no access to
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another server on the network, the other server should not be threatened. This information
can be automatically obtained by a network vulnerability scanner such as NESSUS [21].
In summary, this work has identified that a threat assessment framework for a cyber
attack should include:
1. A definition of threat.
2. A fusion ofWho, What, Where, When, Why, and How.
3. A non-Bayesian technique to determine a quantitative value for the threat.
4. Network-specific knowledge that includes (but not necessarily limited to): network
connectivity, operating systems, and running services.
2.2 Definitions
To ensure clarity, the following terms are defined in alphabetical order.
alert - an IDS alert or system log message.
attack - a sequence of IDS alerts or system log messages that have been grouped
together to represent a single cyber attack.
attributes - Fields contained within an Event, such as Signature, Target IP, or Source
IP.
compromised entity
- an entity that has been overtaken or stolen by the hacker.
entity
- a piece of information or data that can be compromised by the hacker. These
can include: existence of computers, user accounts and critical data.
event - Any EDS alert or system log message that represents something that occurred
on the network.
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Information Graph - A directed graph that represents logical inferencing such that
each node represents an entity on a network. An edge A
> B implies that if A is
compromised, then B can be compromised next.
Sequence Graph - A directed graph that represents logical inferencing such that each
node represents attributes of an event. An edge A > B implies that if A occurs, then
B is able to occur
threat - a situation that could lead to unauthorized access, impairment of network
operations, or a loss of data integrity.
2.3 The Framework
TANDI is a novel threat assessment framework for cyber attacks that assigns numerical
threat scores (also referred to as threat values) to critical network entities based on events
that have occurred. This is done on a per-attack basis. The critical entities comprise the
Information Graph, which represents a logical sequence of how the entities can be com
promised. TANDI also uses two additional Sequence Graphs called the Potential Attack
Sequence (PAS) and the Logical Topology. The PAS is a graph that describes a logical
ordering of alerts that would occur in a cyber attack. This is developed separately of the
logical topology, which describes the order in which computers must be compromised as
suming an attack that originates outside of the network.
While TANDI is referred to as a threat assessment framework, it also incorporates level
2 fusion into its framework. This can be seen by the two processing stages. The first
stage is Situation Assessment, which corresponds to level 2 of the JDL Data Fusion model
[32]. This determines which entities in the network have already been compromised by the
attack. This processing stage can be thought of as a transformation of the detected attack
from the sequence of suspicious events on the network as detected by the alert correlator to
specific entities that have been compromised.
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The second stage is the threat assessment stage. In this stage, the PAS and the Logical
Topology are processed along with the Information Graph to determine what entities are
the next likely target of the attack. TANDI then calculates a threat score of each of these
entities based on four weights.
x
Of the six basic questions presented in Section 2.1, three are directly addressed
- how
(PAS), where (Logical Topology), and what (Information Graph). Why and who are not
directly addressed by this work. Why is simply the intent of the hacker, while who is the
actual hacker. These will likely require a behavioral analysis out of the scope of this work.
Therefore, the hacker will always be considered to be an advanced hacker with a malicious
intent. TANDI incorporates when by factoring in the sequence of the alerts occurring within
an attack, but ignores the exact time elapsed between the alerts since there is not a general
consensus on how this should be interpreted.
Unlike other threat assessment or vulnerability frameworks, the PAS, Logical Topol
ogy, and Information Graph are allowed to be cyclic. This is a distinct advantage over the
frameworks since TANDI is able to assess a different ordering of alerts in an attack us
ing the same graphs, whereas the frameworks requiring a cyclic graphs must use different
graphs for different ordering of alerts.
2.3.1 Inputs
TANDI requires the following inputs to construct a network-specific threat assessment
model prior to running threat assessment in real-time:
1 . A Logical Topology
2. A Potential Attack Sequence
3. An Information Graph
'This work onfy uses one calculation which relies on four weights. This framework is general enough to
support other (potentially more accurate) calculations with more or fewer parameters.
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4. The Operating Systems and services running on each computer
Discussions on how to obtain these inputs will be illustrated in the next few sections.
At run time, TANDI takes the currently detected attacks as the inputs. Each attack
consists of alerts that indicate the hacker's current attempts (successful and unsuccessful)
to gain unauthorized access to the network and are considered to be independent of other
hackers, meaning that each attack is processed separately. There are currently no commer
cial programs that are able to correlate alerts at run time into specific attacks. This work,
thus, leverages work from the research community and mimics outputs from INFERD [28]
as the inputs to TANDI.
2.3.2 Logical Topology
The logical topology incorporates the basic question ofwhere into TANDI. It is a sequence
graph that defines the order in which computers can be compromised on the network. The
logical topology is used to predict a next possible target on the network. TANDI assumes
that cyber attacks originate from computers in the Internet (i.e., outside of the network),
so only computers exposed to the Internet can be compromised directly from the Internet,
such as Web and VPN servers. These will be described as external. Computers inside
a firewall are safe from direct compromise from the Internet and will be called internal.
Many larger networks are segmented into smaller networks that have their own firewalls,
so there can be multiple levels of internal computers.
Nodes on the logical topology can represent one or more computers. All computers
aggregated to the same node should be running the same processes, meaning that they are
all vulnerable to the same attacks. These aggregate nodes can be thought of as a subnet of
workstations.
Figure 2. 1 shows a small logical topology of a network with a web server, a FTP server
and two subnets behind a firewall, each with two computers. Notice how the two subnets
are not connected to Internet computers since they are not exposed to the Internet.
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Figure 2. 1 : Example Logical Topology
The edges are defined by the routing rules and access-lists in the network. For example,
the lack of connectivity in the logical topology between the two subnets indicates that there
is a routing rule preventing traffic flow between them. Therefore, the logical topology can
be generated by referencing the current configurations on the routers and switches in the
network.
One current limitation of the logical topology is that it must be static. It is likely that
a hacker may actually compromise a router and reconfigure the access lists and routing
tables, which would alter the logical topology. Nonetheless, this requirement of a static
logical topology was used to decrease complexity. So TANDI is unable to properly react to
changes in the logical topology. This limitation will be the subject of future research.
2.3.3 Potential Attack Sequence
The potential attack sequence (PAS) incorporates the basic question of how into TANDI. It
represents a logical order of how alert signatures will occur in a cyber attack and may be
developed independent of the logical topology. The PAS is used to predict the next likely
methods of attack by the hacker. One or more alert signatures is represented by each node
in a PAS. The PAS is expected to encompass the thousands of alert signatures from IDS
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and system logs. Therefore, the PAS is the most complex and error prone input to TANDI.
External Internal
^"Intrusion .
Figure 2.2: Potential Attack Sequence Used by TANDI
The developers of INFERD [28] had already implemented a PAS, which they call a
guidance template, of equivalent functionality. A slightly modified version of this PAS was
used for the implementation of TANDI. In the developed PAS, the alerts were classified
into different categories pertaining to the type of attack. The main categories are:
1 . Reconnaissance - alerts that indicate information gathering. These include such alerts
as ICMP Pings, TCP SYN Scans, TCP Port Scans, etc.
2. Intrusion Root - alerts that indicate a system compromise where the hacker has ob
tained root or system-level privileges.
3. Intrusion User - alerts that indicate a system compromise where the hacker has only
obtained user-level access.
4. Intrusion Other - alerts that indicate a system compromise where the privileges ob
tained by the hacker are not known.
5. Privilege Escalation - alerts that indicate that a user's privileges have been escalated
to root or system level.
6. Goal - alerts that indicate that a hacker has likely accomplished a goal such as de
stroying or pilfering data.
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The original INFERD guidance template was very dense, so the number of nodes were
reduced by aggregating some nodes together to form the PAS shown in Figure 2.2, which
is the same PAS that was used to implement TANDI. Each node in Figure 2.2 implicitly
represents all alerts corresponding to its respective category. Note that this PAS can also
easily be extended to multiple levels of internal computers. Since the PAS is used for
prediction, it is necessary to filter any alerts that cannot logically occur. For example, if
no external computers are running an SSH service, no alerts corresponding to SSH should
be included in the external portion of the PAS. Therefore, the services of both internal and
external machines must be known before creating the guidance template. Vulnerability
scanners such as Nessus [21] are able to accurately identify running services automatically.
2.3.4 Information Graph
The information graph represents the relationships between network entities such as priv
ileges, databases, proprietary files, etc. By analyzing the structure of modem machines
and the typical attack sequences, an inherent three level hierarchy of network entities was
observed: an attacker needs to (1) know the existence of the machine or subnet, (2) obtain
appropriate access privilege, and (3) access the target information or files. Based on this
observation and inspiration from the work by Phillips and Swiler [23] and that by Liu and
Man [18], a template representing an information subgraph for a typical machine is devel
oped and shown in Figure 2.3. This template is cloned with changes for each of the nodes
in the logical topology graph. Together, the clones form the entire information graph.
Each of the entities in each clone is associated with the corresponding machine or sub
net, as well as the attacks that can compromise the entity. Note that the edges in Figure
2.4 represent the associativity of the cloned information nodes to the nodes in the logical
topology and those in the attack sequence graph. During the process of the cloning, the
IDS alerts belonging to the associated attacks but cannot occur for the services running on
the corresponding machines will be removed. This is done to increase the accuracy of the







Figure 2.3: Information Graph Template defined for each computer or group of computers.
Note the "Incoming
Computer"
node and the "Outgoing
Computer"
node in the tem
plate. These two nodes are used to build the connection between network entities associ
ated with different machines. For any directed edge A > B in the logical topology, the
information nodes representing the existence of and the privileges at machine A will be
connected to those of machine B (also with directed edges). These connections complete
the automatic generation of the information graph.
Extending to Network Accounts and Shared Data
The automatic generation of the information discussed above only factors in user accounts
and files of specific computers. While this may suffice for some networks, most networks
these days contain shared files or databases that are remotely accessible from other com
puters on the network. These files can only be accessed by certain user accounts. It may
be the case, though, that these network user accounts are only available on a certain set of
computers.
Figure 2.5 incorporates network accounts and shared files to the automatic generation of
the Information Graph. The network administrator is responsible for identifying the critical
files or databases. Access to such files usually are organized by user groups. Therefore,
aggregate nodes of user groups represent all of the user accounts contained within the user
group. The user groups that are able to access these critical files are then linked to this data.
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Attack Sequence Logical Topology
Figure 2.4: An example showing the attack sequence, the information graph, the logical
topology, and how they are interconnected.
The user accounts are then linked to the cloned information graph of the computer that the
user can log into. This example shows two critical files shared between three different user
groups.
2.3.5 Situation Assessment Stage
Each node in the logical topology and the attack sequence graphs are to be evaluated in real
time as cyber attacks occur. The asserted nodes reflect that the corresponding machines
have been compromised or attackmethods have been used. Consider this real-time situation
assessment that provides indication of the attacker's capability (the types of attack methods
he knows), and that of the attacker's opportunity (the machines or subnets he or she has
compromised). By fusing the two, one may predict the intent of the attacker's next target,
i.e., the nodes with high threat scores in the information graph. Following this intuition,
TANDI performs situation and threat assessments on a per attack basis; that is, IDS alerts
belonging to different attacks will be evaluated separately. Grouping alerts to different





Figure 2.5: Incorporating Network User Accounts and Shared Files into the Automatic
Generation of the Information Graph
The fusion of the logical topology and the attack sequence information for predicting
the threatened network entity may be represented with the use of the undirected edges con
necting the nodes in the three model graphs, as shown in Figure 2.4. A network entity is
connected to a machine or a subnet if the machine or the subnet contains or can access the
entity. Similarly, a network entity is connected to an attack node if such type of attack can
compromise the entity. The nodes in the logical topology and attack sequence can also be
aggregate nodes that represent a group of computers (e.g., a subnet) or a set of alerts. These
connections dictate how TANDI performs situation and threat assessments. For situation
assessment, the information nodes that are associated with at least one of the asserted attack
nodes and at least one of the asserted topology nodes are considered asserted or,
equiva-
lently, compromised. For example, considering Figure 2.4, if an IDS alert aggregated by
the
"Intrusion"
node occurs on the "Web Server", TANDI will determine that the "Web
Server
Privileges"




denote the ith of G alerts and
M*
be the target(s) of A*. Let
A*
represent the set of alert signatures that have occurred in the current attack.
M*
represents
the set of target computers that have been attacked and
/*
represents the entities that have











Let A(X) ,M(X), I(X) denote the set of successor nodes to the set of nodes, X, from
the guidance template, logical topology, and information graph, respectively. The set of
compromised entities, /*, can be represented by:
G





Figure 2.6: Situation Assessment Feature Tree
Equation (2.3) is equivalent to using the feature tree in Figure 2.6 for each entity to
determine if it is compromised. Note that this feature tree encompasses both (2.3) and the
undirected edges between the sequence graphs and the information graph in Figure 2.4. It
is possible that the undirected edges between the sequence graphs and information graph
could be generated automatically. IDS websites, such as www.snort.org, provide a database
of the alert name, the exploit or attack it represents, the consequences of a successful attack
and the affected operating systems and services. A program could be developed to extract
information from this database and automatically generate the undirected edges.
2.3.6 Threat Assessment Stage
Recall that the proposed threat assessment algorithm examines the successor nodes of those
that have been asserted due to previous actions of a given attack. Denote the set of informa
tion nodes that have been compromised no later than the jth event occurring in attack A as
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I*(ef), and their successor nodes as I(I*(ef)). For completeness,
I*
= I*(e) when e^ is
the final event in attack A. Note that, in this definition, the set I(I*(ef)) will exclude those
that are also in the set I*(ef). Immediately after the jth event of attack A, a threat score,
0 < U(ef) < 1 will be determined for every node in the set I(I*(ef)). All nodes in I*(ef)
are assigned a threat score of one, indicating that they have been compromised. Nodes that
are not in either of these two sets (i.e., nodes that are two or more hops from all nodes in
I*(ef)) are assigned a threat score of zero. Note that, by restricting assessing threat scores
for the successors of already compromised nodes, one can detect an abnormality, such as





Figure 2.7: Threat Assessment Feature Tree
To determine the threat scores for the nodes in I(I*(ef)) upon the occurrence of the
jth event of attack A, a feature tree is evaluated for each of these nodes. Figure 2.7 shows
the feature tree used for the "Web
Privilege"
node drawn in Figure 2.4. Note that the alerts




alerts that can happen on a web server. The structure of this feature tree determines the
fusion rule, and is followed for all the nodes in the information graph. The feature trees for
different information node differ in the alerts and the machines that are connected as leaf
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nodes.
In the current implementation, a
'Sum-of-SumSets'
operation is used for the fusion
rule, which is the calculation used to determine the threat score. The Sum-of-SumSet
operation uses only four pre-determined weights, which is a substantial reduction from the
probability inferencing approach where one needs to determine the weights for all edges.
The four weights: Aa*, Am*, Aa(a*)> and \m{m-) correspond to the partial threat scores due
to the already asserted attack nodes (A*), the already asserted machines (M*), the successor
nodes of A*, (A(A*)), and the successors of
M*
, (M(M*)), respectively. The Sum-of-
SumSet operation basically sums up the weights of the leaf nodes, i.e., the alerts and the
machines, but only adds once for each type of weight. In other words, if two machines
leaf nodes are both asserted, only one XM. will be added to the overall threat score for the
corresponding information node. This operation ensures that the threat score is less than
one for all nodes that could be compromised next as long as Aa*+Am* +Aa(a*) +Am(m*) <
1.
A drawback of this approach is that the threat score does not distinguish network entities
that are associated with more asserted attack nodes or machines from those associated
with less. This will be addressed in future work regarding a better, if not optional, fusion
rule. Intuition has that Aa* > Aa(a*) and Am* > Am(m*) should define the relationships
between the weights. This intuition stems from the assumptions that a computer that has
been attacked is likely to be attacked again and that an attack method that has been used is
likely to be executed again. This intuition is tested in Section 3.4.3.
The prediction accuracy ofTANDI relies on the correctness of themodels and templates
developed by SMEs, which is expected as any threat assessment algorithm may claim. As
will be discussed in the next section, the current version of TANDI will provide indication
for any abnormality due to possible modeling flaws.
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2.4 Generalization of TANDI
While TANDI was developed for cyber security, its framework could easily be generalized
for potential use in other domains. The information graph will represent entities within
the domain that can be compromised by an attacker. Multiple sequence graphs can be
defined to capture who, where, when, why, and how, or potential combinations thereof.
The introduction of new sequence graphs will only introduce a constant number ofweights
per sequence graph added.
2.5 Basic Implementation Details
TANDI was implemented using Java 1.5. It was developed strictly for simulation, so the
logical topologies and services were generated manually and are not integrated with any
automatic network scanners. The graph classes and visualization were implemented using
the Prefuse API alpha 04.01.2005 [10]. Other visual elements were developed using the
Java Swing package.
TANDI was built to be highly configurable for specific networks. The logical topol
ogy, PAS, information graph, alert signatures, underlying feature trees, and attacks are all
provided and managed through XML files.
Two programs were created using the TANDI core. RunCyberTA allows the user to vi
sually step through the attack to see how the threat scores change as the attack progresses.
A screenshot from this program is shown in Figure 2.8. This simulates how a network
administrator would view an attack as it progresses in real time. It also outputs various
metrics that will be discussed in the next chapter. RunCyberSim is a command-line sim
ulation package that allows multiple attacks to be simulated over multiple topologies. It
outputs a comma-delimited file of the results of the simulations for analysis in a spread
sheet or database program.
The source code and documentation of TANDI and associated programs can be found
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Figure 2.8: Screenshot of RunCyberTA in the Middle of a Cyber Attack. A larger radius
indicates a higher threat.
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2.5.1 System Organization
To aid in the organization of the source code, several Java packages were developed for
TANDI. This section discusses the packages developed and some of the features provided
by each. The javadoc provided on the thesis CD can be referenced for more technical
documentation regarding the actual method calls and class specifications.
ta
The ta package provides the core functionality of TANDI, including the RunCyberTA and
RunCyberSim main classes. This package provides the data structures for the graphs and
incoming attacks. The ThreatAssessor class is the processing class for TANDI and is used
to create an instance of TANDI. The PAS and Logical Topology are referred to as sequence
graphs. ThreatAssessor was defined such that the number of sequence graphs is arbitrary.
This allows the user to define more or less than the two sequence graphs used in TANDI.
As discussed in 2.4 these sequence graphs may capture why or who.
AssertableLogicalTreeNodeOrganizer is used tomanage the possible alerts or computer
nodes that could be asserted by incoming attacks. Due to the definition of a tree node in
Prefuse, a tree node can only have one parent. Therefore, if a node is defined in more than
one tree (such as the Information Graph and PAS), it must be cloned. AssertableLogical-
TreeNodeOrganizer manages these clones so that all clones are updated properly if another
changes.
This package also contains the classes used to generate the ThreatAssessor objects
containing the PAS and logical topologies used in simulation. This code generates the
ThreatAssessor object and writes the Information Graph template, Logical Topology, and




The ta.generator package provides the automatic generation of an information graph from a
template information graph and the logical topology. It currently does not support network
resources as discussed in Section 2.3.4.
It also provides functionality to filter any alerts from the PAS that could not logically
occur based on the services running in the different segments on either side of a firewall.
ta.io
The ta.io packages provides XML parsers to read in XML files to create a ThreatAssessor
object and incoming attacks. It also includes an XML writer that allows a ThreatAssessor
object to be written to XML format. There is a subpackage ta.io.gt that is used to parse an
INFERD Guidance Template and translate into the format used for TANDI.
ta.gui
The ta.gui package provides the graphical user interface for RunCyberTA. Java swing was
used along with the graphical objects provided by Prefuse for graph visualization.
ta.logicaltree
The ta.logicaltree package provides extensions to Prefuse for the data structures needed for
the situation assessment and threat assessment feature trees. An AssertableLogicalTreeN-
ode is a leaf node that can be asserted by incoming alerts. A LogicalTreeNode implements
the aggregation operators such as and, or, sum, and sum set used in TANDI's feature trees.
Since the situation and threat assessment feature trees differ only in the operations, the
LogicalTreeNode class allows formultiple modes of operation, so the situation assessment
and threat assessment feature trees are combined into only one feature tree. Situation and
threat assessment functionality can be switched by simply changing the mode of evaluation
of the tree. This feature was included to reduce the memory required for the feature trees.
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ta.stats
This class provides statistics for the evaluation of TANDI. Each developed statistic imple
ments the TAAttackStatistic interface and analyzes the collection of threat scores TANDI





To validate and examine the performance of TANDI, it was simulated over two networks.
Due to liability, loss of reputation, and competition issues, cyber attack data is not currently
available in the public domain [30]. Simulations were therefore limited to attacks generated
via a simple attack generator to mimic the outputs of a cyber attack detector. Multiple
metrics were developed to analyze the performance of TANDI. A small network was first
simulated. Then, a relatively large network was simulated to demonstrate the scalability of
TANDI.
3.1 Simulated Network Topologies
3.1.1 Small Network Topology
TANDI was first simulated using three variants of the network topology shown in Figure
3.1. This is a fictitious network representing a small to medium business that will have
different subnets. The three variants of this topology represent cases due to different routing
rules plausible for the network. This allows the examination of the cases of external servers
and internal subnets being able (or not being able) to communicate with each other. The
following three variants of the topology were set up and used for simulation:
Network 1 assumes that all four subnets are completely segmented from each other.
The only connection the four subnets have is that they all have one server connecting
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to the Internet.
Network 2 is the same as the first topology, except that all four external servers
are fully connected to each other. This setup is similar to network 1, other than
external computers should bemore highly threatened as alerts are seen on the external
computers.
Network 3 is the same as the second topology, except that all internal computers in
all subnets are fully connected.
^H
Figure 3.1: The network topology used for simulations. Blocks with a dotted background
are external computers while all others are internal. The corresponding IP address(es) and
services running are indicated.
This was the main network for simulations. Remember that the edges are defined based
on routing rules and access-lists. So the only difference between the three topologies is
in the configurations of routers and switches. Each topology was simulated over different
weight assignments for normal attacks, attacks with mis-detections and insider threats.
3.1.2 Large Network Topology
To illustrate the scalability of TANDI, it was simulated over a larger network. Like the
smaller network, this is also a fictitious network that was meant to simulate the network of
a medium to large business. It consisted of multiple subnets and many redundant servers
to improve the number of users that can access the business's information. This network
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will be referred to as "Network 4". This network was simulated over different weight
assignments for normal attacks.
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Figure 3.2: A Larger Computer Network to Simulate
The logical topology for the large network is shown in Figure 3.2. Notice that the logi
cal topology complexity does not vary significantly from the smaller topology (Figure 3.1).
In fact, the large topology actually has fewer nodes in the logical topology. This is because
the increased number of servers in a large typical large network form server farms, consist
ing ofmany identically configured servers. The server farms are used to allow concurrent
access to data stored on the servers by multiple users. Since the servers have the same ser
vices running, they are all vulnerable to the same attacks. They can therefore be grouped
into one single node in the logical topology. This network's "Server
Farm"
node consists of
10 file servers. Similar to the idea of server farms, the network size increase is due to simi
larly configured workstations, and not necessarily a significantly larger number of subnets.
There are three main subnets to this network: the Operations, Marketing, and Accounting
and are their own subnet. Each subnet consists of 100 workstations and has its own server
to support the needs of each group individually. In this network, vulnerability updates are
handled every evening, so each workstation will have the same patches
- so the worksta
tions can be grouped into one node. It should also be noted that the accounting server is
only accessible by the accounting workstations and some other servers. The reason that
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the Accounting Server is not accessible from, say, the marketing workstations, is because
access lists in the routers prevent this possibility of this traffic flow. So this illustrates that
the edges in the Logical Topology are largely dictated by routing rules within the network
itself.
3.2 Attack Simulator
A simple cyber attack simulator was developed to generate the simulation data. These
generated attacks mimic the inputs that would be provided by a lower-level cyber attack
detector or IDS alert correlator. Each attack is a set of IDS alerts and system log messages
that represent an actual cyber attack. These generated attacks represented compromises of
a single machine, multi-computer attacks that posed a large threat to the network, insider
threats, and mis-correlations by the detector.
The actual generation of the attacks involved the following steps. An entity was selected
to be compromised that would be realistic for the type of attack generated. An IDS alert
or system log message that corresponded to the compromise of that entity was randomly
chosen from a pool of probable alerts. This process is then repeated for each step in the
attack. Careful consideration was taken to the order of these alerts, so they represented a
realistic output from a cyber attack detector.
The small network was simulated over five different sets of attacks. It should be noted
that the low number of cyber attacks do not make the results statistically significant, but
do allow for the identification of basic trends that would be worthwhile to analyze over a
larger set of attacks. Due to the limited availability of cyber attack data, generation of a
statistically significant number of attacks was outside of the scope of this work.
The five sets used in simulating the small network are summarized as follows:
Set 0 (15Attacks) - A normal set of attacks corresponding to cyber attacks originat
ing from the Internet. Each of these attacks first compromises at least one external
computer and may penetrate into one or more internal computers. Each attack had
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between 6 and 21 events.
Set 1 (10Attacks) - A set of attacks that contain abnormalities that correspond to false
positives from an IDS and mis-correlations by a cyber attack detector. They could
also represent errors in the information graph, logical topology or PAS. Each attack
had between 4 and 12 events.
Set 2 (5 Attacks) - A set of insider attacks. These attacks originate internally, so
external computers are not compromised. These attacks are a more extreme version
of Set 1. Each attack had between 3 and 6 events.
Set 3 (2 Attacks) - One coordinated attack that was fragmented into two separate at
tacks. These two attacks were then combined to test the affect of combining potential
coordinated attacks.
Set 4 (4 Attacks) - One coordinated attack that was fragmented into four separate
attacks.
The large network was only simulated over 10 normal attacks. Since the network is
different, the actual attacks differ from those in "Set 0", but the type of attacks are the
same.
3.3 Statistics for Evaluating TANDI
This work defines a set of specific metrics that are used to analyze a threat assessment
framework, such as TANDI. These metrics indicate the performance of the framework over
a set of simulation data. Therefore, these metrics allow the comparisons between two or
more threat assessment frameworks. Previously, there were not common metrics to analyze
threat assessment frameworks, so there was no standard way to show that a framework is
"better"
than another framework. Since threat assessment involves the prediction of an
attacker's next action, and data is usually limited, it is very difficult to truly assess its
accuracy.
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Even though the focus of this thesis is cyber attacks, these metrics are defined indepen
dent of domain. It should be noted, however, that in some domains (including our current
knowledge of the cyber domain), not all metrics defined here may make sense or even be
applicable.
There is not one specific metric that can be used to encompass overall performance.
Each metric provides its own analysis of the framework and incoming attacks. Different
situations may deem one ormore of these metrics to become unreliable, so differentmetrics
are provided that attempt to cover the other's downfalls.
These metrics will then be collected over different sets of data for attacks on the two
different networks.
The following lists six metrics that were developed to provide an indication of the
performance of a threat assessment algorithm.
1 . Average Normalized Compromising Score
2. Average Percentile ofCompromising Score
3. Top Threat Score Prediction Percent
4. Percent False Positives
5. Percent False Negatives
6. Percent Assessee Reduction






The framework assesses the threat of specific entities within a domain and assigns a threat
score, 0 < U(ef) < maxjpossible threat score where 0 < maxjpossible threatjcore <
oo, to the rth entity upon the occurrence of the jth event of an attack A, where the threat
scores satisfy the following adjectives, which qualitatively describe the threat level of an
entity:
Compromised: U(ef) = maxj>ossible_threat_score
Threatened: 0 < U(ef) < max_possible threatjcore
Unthreatened: U(ef) = 0
The maxpossible threatjcore is simply the maximum threat score a framework can
assign to an entity, which corresponds to the value indicating that an entity is compro
mised. Ifmaxjpossiblethreatjcore is finite it is recommended that the threat scores be
normalized.
The above constraints should be general enough to encompass a large range of threat
assessment frameworks. Note that it is not required that any sequence of entities be defined
(like the Information Graph in TANDI), nor does the method of assigning the threat score
matter.
3.3.2 Metric Definitions
3.3.3 Average Normalized Compromising Score
An ideal threat assessment algorithm with perfectmodels should generate threat scores that
accurately depict the sequence of attack events. In other words, the compromised entity
should have the highest threat score with respect to the other threatened entities one step
before it is compromised. Based on this intuition, a normalized compromising score, i*(A),
is defined as the normalized threat score for entity i one eventprior to it being compromised
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by attack A. That is,
t,(e^
where Cf indicates the set of entities that have not been compromised prior to and in
cluding event j of attack A. The average of the normalized threat scores of entities com
promised by an attack A is the average normalized compromising score, i*(A). For a
"perfect"
assessment, i*(A) would be 1, indicating that each compromised entity has the
highest threat score just before it is compromised. Averaging i*(A) for different attacks,
denoted as *, could then be indicative to the accuracy of a threat assessment algorithm.
Note that, however, this metric can be misleading ifmany entities share the same highest
threat score. For example, a worthless algorithm that assigns the same threat score to all




The average percentile rank is the average percentile rank of all entities one event prior to
being compromised. Note that this includes both threatened and unthreatened entities in
the percentile calculation. The idea here is to evaluate whether the compromised entities
indeed have a high threat score as compared to all uncompromised entities.
Top Threat Score Prediction Frequency
Top Threat Score Prediction Percent indicates the percentage of compromised nodes such
that its average normalized compromising score was one, e.g., i*(A) = a, 0 < a < 1. This
indicates how often the next compromised entity was accurately predicted. The parameter
a is a threshold that indicates the minimum normalized threat score that is high enough to
be an accurate prediction. Like average normalized compromising score, this metric can
become unreliable whenmany there are many entities with normalized threat scores higher
than a.
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Percent False Positives and Percent False Negatives
Let 0 be a minimum threshold indicating a threat score high enough for an analyst to war
rant looking at. For an attack, A, that has K events, a false positive shall occur when
maxfcKii(e^)
>= 0 and i*(A) is undefined, meaning that the entity was never compro
mised. In other words, a false positive occurs when an entity has a high threat score and is
never actually compromised by the attack.
A false negative shall occur when
3ii*
(A) < 0. In other words, a false negative oc
curs when an entity with a low threat score that the analyst likely would not have been
immediately drawn to becomes compromised.
Percent false negatives and percent false positives can then be formally defined as fol
lows. Let Na(X) be the number of entities in attack A that satisfy the condition X. Let Ca
represent the set of compromised entities due to attack A. Percent false negatives can then
be defined in (3.2) and percent false positives can then be defined in (3.3).
Percent False Negatives = j (3.2)
\Ga\
D + P , D
-+- N* ((maxfc6K-ti(4) >= 0) and (i CA)) ....
Fercent_b alse_Positives = r-. (i.i)
|Ca!
Percent Assessee Reduction
Percent assessee reduction is a measure of the percentage of nodes whose threat scores are
below a threshold, 0. It captures the percentage of nodes that the analyst should not have
to look at since they have a lower threat.
3.3.4 Percent Threatened
Percent threatened indicates the percentage of non-compromised entities that have a threat
score greater than or equal to a threshold, 0, due to a specific attack. This is not a threat
assessment accuracymetric, but rather a metric thatwould be presented to the analyst. With
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respect the overall threat of an attack, a high percent threatened metric indicates that the
corresponding attacker has the opportunity to compromise many entities, and the analyst
may want to focus on treating that attack. With respect to framework performance, a high
percent threatened metric may also indicate that the current prediction is too conservative,
meaning that the framework is predicting too many entities to have a high probability of
being attacked next.
Percent Abnormal
An abnormal entity, or abnormality, is an entity whose compromising score is zero, i.e.,
t*(A) = 0. Percent abnormal is the percentage of abnormalities over the set of compro
mised entities. Like percent threatened, this is not a threat assessment accuracy metric, but
rather a metric that would be presented to the analyst.
In regards to TANDI and cyber attacks, an abnormality will occur in the any of follow
ing situations:
Sensor readings: the abnormality could be due to a false positive or undetected event.
Event correlator: the correlator responsible for level 2 fusion could have falsely cor
related (or uncorrelated) events to an attack. A mis-correlation at this level could be
due to a stealthy coordinated attack by multiple attackers.
Threat assessmentmodel: incomplete or inaccurate models used by the threat assess
ment algorithm.
Insider threat: Any threat assessment algorithm is susceptible to not detecting in
sider threats if assumes that attacks will originate from outside of the organizational
network.
Therefore, percent abnormal can be used to identify potential insider threats or flaws in the
framework.
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3.4 Results and Discussion
3.4.1 Example Attack and Threat Scores
Figure 3.3 illustrates an example simulated attack from Set 0 and the evaluated threat scores
at each stage of the attack for a subset ofnetwork entities in the information graph. Network
1 of the small network is used for this example, and the weights used for threat assessment
are given in the caption of the figure. The bold number for each entity indicates the threat
score one step before the entity was compromised. Note that there was no abnormality in
this attack, and TANDI identified the next potential target with the highest threat score,




in Step 2. Note that the
average normalized compromising score is 0.74. This means that the average entity had a
normalized threat score of 0.74 prior to being compromised. If this value were much lower,
this likely indicates that there are deficiencies in the Logical Topology, PAS, Information
Graph, or weight assignment.
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Figure 3.3: Example threat scores during the progression of a cyber attack with the weights
of AA- = 0.2, Xa(A') = 0.05, Xm" = 0.3, XM(M")
= 0.1. Both the actual and normalized
threat scores are shown for each entity. Nodes compromised are indicated with an 'X'.
3.4.2 The Sensitivity ofWeights
TANDI requires four parameters. To determine the values to assign to these parameters, a
sensitivity analysis of the weights was first performed. Since the normalized values of the
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threat scores are used in the metrics, the initial hypothesis was that only the relative values
of the weight parameters significantly affect the results. The absolute values of the weight
parameters will affect the results, but not significantly enough to warrant these values to
affect the performance of TANDI.
To test this hypothesis, all four topologies were simulated using their respective Set 0
data, which contained normal attacks. Each attack was simulated over all weight combi
nations possible by varying each parameter by 0.1. These weight combinations were then
separated into two sets. Set A contained all weight combinations such that W(A*) >
W(A(A*)) > 0 and W(M*) > W(M(M*)) > 0, while set B contained all weight com
binations such that W(A(A*)) > W(A*) > 0 and W(M(M*)) > W(M*) > 0. The
weight combinations for each set is shown in Figure 3.4.
Topologies 1 -3 did not exhibit much difference from each other. Topology 4 did yield
different values, but the trends exhibited by the sensitivity analysis were the same as
Topologies 1-3. Therefore, Topology 2 was arbitrarily chosen for this analysis. Figures
3.5-3.7 show the sensitivity graphs for both sets over topology 2 for average normalized
compromising score, average percent false positives, and average percent false negatives.
The X-axis of each of these graphs contain all weight combinations relevant for each of set
A and set B. As the weight configurations progress across the X-axis, the weights for the
PAS increase, while the weights for the Logical Topology decrease. Due to space limita
tion for the graph, the actual weight configurations for each point are not shown. Figure
3.5 shows small changes in the average normalized compromising score within each set.
However, set B was consistently higher. Possible reasons for this result are discussed in
the next section. This illustrates the initial conjecture regarding relative weight assignment
beingmore important. Figure 3.6 shows virtually no change in the false positives across the
different weight assignments. Figure 3.7 shows more interesting results. Both sets exhibit
a general upward trend of the false negatives as the PAS weights increase and the Logical
Topology weights decrease. This shows that there are generally a higher percentage of false
negatives when the PAS is weighted higher than the Logical Topology.
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: Set A
! W(A*) W(A(A' W(M-) W(M(M'
02 01 02 0.1
0.2 01 03 0.1
02 01 0 3 02
0.2 0.1 04 01
0.2 0 1 04 02
0.2 01 04 03
0.2 0.1 05 0.1
0.2 0.1 05 0.2
0.2 0.1 06 01
03 01 02 01
03 0.1 03 01
03 0.1 0.3 0.2
0.3 0.1 04 0.1
0.3 0.1 04 0.2
03 01 05 01
0.3 0 2 02 0 1
0 3 0.2 03 0 1
0.3 0.2 03 0.2
0.3 02 04 0.1
04 01 02 0.1
04 01 03 0.1
04 01 03 02
04 0.1 04 0.1
04 0.2 0.2 01
04 0.2 03 0.1
04 03 02 01
05 0.1 02 01
0.5 01 03 01
0.5 0.2 02 01
0.6 01 0.2 01
SetB
W(A') W(A(A-)) W(M-) W(M(M'
0.1 02 0.1 0.2
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
0.1 0.2 01 0.4
0.1 0.2 01 0.5
01 0 2 01 06
0.1 0 2 02 0 3
0.1 0.2 0 2 0.4
01 0.2 0 2 0.5
0.1 02 03 04
0.1 03 0.1 02
01 0.3 01 03
0.1 0.3 01 0.4
0.1 0.3 01 0.5
01 0.3 0.2 0.3
01 0.3 02 0.4
01 04 01 0.2
0 1 04 01 03
01 04 01 0.4




0.1 0 5 01 0.3
01 06 01 02
02 0.3 01 0.2
0.2 0.3 01 0.3
0.2 0.3 01 0.4
02 03 02 03
02 04 01 02
0.2 0.4 01 0.3
02 05 0.1 0.2
03 04 01 0.2
Figure 3.4: Weight Combinations














Figure 3.5: Average Normalized Compromising Score Sensitivity (Topology 2)
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Figure 3.6: Average Percent False Positives Sensitivity 0 = 1 (Topology 2)









Figure 3.7: Average Percent False Negatives Sensitivity 0 = 0.6 (Topology 2)
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3.4.3 The Effect ofWeights
Now that the sensitivity of the weights was analyzed, the effect of varying the relative
values of the weights was analyzed. Since the threat scores are normalized in analysis, the
absolute values of the weights are not as important as the relative values of the weights.
This was illustrated in the previous section. Therefore, the magnitude of the weights used
in this analysis were arbitrary,
Both the large and small networks were simulated using their respective Set 0 data
that contained normal attacks originating from the Internet and contained no abnormalities.
Using the weight assignment intuition from Section 2.3.6, the following two hypotheses
were tested:
Hypothesis 1: An attack method that has already attempted is more likely to occur
again than a new attack. Therefore, the weights should be set up such that A^* >
Xa(a*)-
Hypothesis 2: A computer that has been attacked is more likely to be attacked again
than a different computer. Therefore, the weights should be set up such that Am* >
AM(M*)-
Avtrag* NormaHztd Compromising Scor* (Stt 0)
0301.04015 03010.1504 01.03,04015 0103015.04
WeightAssignment {W(A>, W<A<A"(|, W(M), W(M(M'|1]
Figure 3.8: Average Normalized Compromising Score (Set 0)
Figures 3.8-3.13 illustrates the performance of the given metrics for the four simulated
topologies. The average percentile rank did not exhibit any noticeable trends in Figure 3.9.
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Avenge Percentile (Set 0)
0 3.0 1,0 -1 0.15 0 3,0 1,0.15.0.4 0 1.0 3.0.4 0.15 0 1,0 3,0.15.0.4
WeightAssignment [W(A), V'J(A(A|i. W(U), W<M('.V)|]
Figure 3.9: Average Percentile Rank (Set 0)
Percent False Positives (Set 0]
0 30 1.0-1,0 15 0.3 0 1,0 15,0.4 0.1 0.3 0 4.0 1S 0.1 0.3 0 15.0 4
Weight Assignment [W(A). W(A(A')), VJ(Mj, W(r.WLV||J
Figure 3.10: Percent False Positives (Set 0) (5 = 1
Percent False Negatives (Set 0)
0.3 0.1.0 4.015 0.301015 0 4 0.1 0.3 0 4.0 15 01 03 0 15,0 4
Weigh) Assignment [W(A| ,
W(A(Ai
||.W(H),W(M(I.r)|]
Figure 3.1 1 : Percent False Negatives (Set 0) 0 = 1
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0.3 01 0 4.0 15 0.3 01 015,0-4 01 0 3.0 4.0.15 01030 15 0J
WeightAssignment pH(A|,W(A<A-H, W(H),WfUfU'fl]
Figure 3.12: Percent False Negatives (Set 0) 3 = 0.6
Average Percent Assessee Reduction (Set 0)
0 3.0 1 .0.4.015 0 3 01 0.15.0 4 010 3 0 4.0.15 010 3 0 15 0 4
Weight Assignment JW(A],Wp^A")]. WfMj, W(H(H-))]
Figure 3.13: Average Percent Assessee Reduction (Set 0) 3
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The far right weight assignment (where successor nodes are given a larger weight) had the
highest average normalized compromising score across all topologies in Figure 3.8. The
average normalized compromising across all topologies and sets score ranged from 0.69 to
0.89.
However, the far right weight assignment did yield the largest percentage of false posi
tives but the fewest percentage of false negatives (Figures 3.10 and 3.11). For this analysis,
a very strict definition of false negatives was used, meaning that any entity compromised
with a normalized threat score of less than 1 were considered to be false negatives (i.e.,
0 = 1). Since the average normalized compromising threat score ranged between 0.69
and 0.89, it indicates that the average entity was compromised with a score less than one,
which explains the high number of false negatives. When this threshold was relaxed to 0.6
the percentage of false negatives improved as shown in Figure 3.12. The far right weight
assignment did also yield a significantly larger number of false positives. This is likely due
to the large number of alerts in the PAS and number of computers in the Logical Topol
ogy. This means that there are a significantly larger number of adjacent alerts than asserted
alerts and adjacent computers than attacked computers. Therefore, a larger number of enti
ties were highly threatened, but the same number of entities were compromised.
In threat prediction, the idea of false positives and negatives seem to be valid evaluation
metrics, since they indicate the entities that were not assessed properly. However, these
metrics may not be very applicable to the cyber domain. When an external hacker attacks
a computer network, he often is unaware of where the important information is. Therefore,
the hacker may take some unexpected steps in the execution of the attack. This would
increase the number of false negatives. Likewise, the hacker may be targeting only one
piece of critical information, so once the hacker compromises that information, nothing
else would be compromised. This would increase the percentage of false positives. A
forensic analysis of the attack would allow the evaluation ofwhether false positives or false
negatives are actually applicable. Since TANDI is the first cyber
attack threat assessment
framework, it is unclear what is considered to be an acceptable or unacceptable percentage
55
of false positives and negatives. As the field of cyber attack threat assessment matures and
more frameworks are developed, a consensus could eventually be reached on this issue.
Figure 3.13 shows that the average percent assessee reduction was also noticeably lower
for the far right weight assignment, however, this is likely due to the high number of false
positives. These results suggest that there could be a potential tradeoff between false posi
tives and average normalized compromising score. However, there are not enough attacks
to make these results statistically significant.
The hypotheses seem to be refuted based on these results: higher Xa{A') and Xm(m')
actually exhibit better performance. An in-depth analysis of the attacks provides interesting
insights towards network dependent threat assessment. Most of the attacks in this test
set focus on subnets 34 and 37, which contain servers with different services running.
Since different services are running on different computers, a previously executed exploit
could not be used on the successor machine. Therefore, a high value of Aa* does not help
to predict the next attack event. Similarly, because the test network has each computer
ran a single service, the number of successive attack events for the same computer is not
as many as originally expected. If, however, the threat assessment is performed on the
scale of subnets, i.e., network IDSs are used instead of host-based IDSs, one should expect
a relatively long sequence of attack events appearing on the same subnet
- the original
hypothesis 2 should still hold. This analysis leads to the following two revised hypotheses:
Revised Hypothesis 1: In the case where networks containmany similar computers,
a weight assignment of Aa* > Aa(a*) should outperform Aa* < Aa(a*)- In the case
where networks have a wide array of services running across different computers, the
opposite weight assignment should yield a better threat prediction.
Revised Hypothesis 2: In the case where mainly network-based IDSs are used to
detect attacks, XM. > XM(m*) should outperform AM* < AM(m*)- hi the case where
host-based IDSs and extensive system logs are used to detect attacks, the opposite
weight assignment should yield a better threat prediction.
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3.4.4 Abnormalities/Insider Threats
Twomore sets ofdatawere generated to test how well TANDI handles abnormalities. These
two attack sets were compared against the baseline Set 0 with no abnormality
- the one used
for the analysis in Section 3.4.3. Similar to those in Set 0, attacks from Set 1 always started
by an Internet computer attacking an external machine, but a network entity that does not
belongs to I(I*(e^)) may be compromised next in the middle of the attack. Set 2 takes
one step further and contains attacks that start at an internal machine, representing insider









]1oc-ocm 0 OC'CJ cacH
Figure 3.14: Percent Abnormal over Sets 1-3
Average Normalizing Compromising Score
Figure 3.15: Average of the normalized compromising scores for the set of
normal attacks
(set 0), a set of attacks with abnormalities (set 1), and a set of
insider threats (set 2).
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Figure 3.17: Percent False Positives over Sets 1-3
Figures 3.14 - 3.18 show the metrics relevant to the analysis of these attacks. It can
easily be seen in Figure 3.14 that set 0 contains no abnormalities, while the percent abnor
malities increased for sets 1 and 2. Again, average percentile yielded no interesting results
in Figure 3.16, therefore, this may indicate that average percentile may not be a worth
while metric to use in analysis. While the false positives were very low in Figure 3.17, the
false negatives were very high across all cases in 3.18. This is likely due to the increased
number of abnormalities where unthreatened entities were being compromised without any
previous indication of threat. The average normalized compromising score shows that as
the abnormalities increase, this metric drastically decreases, thus showing that TANDI per
formed poorly in the occurrence of abnormalities. These results were expected because
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Percent False Negauv*i
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Figure 3.18: Percent False Negatives over Sets 1-3/9 = 1
TANDI assumes that attacks will follow the possible courses of action defined by the log
ical topology. The abnormalities happen when the hackers take unexpected actions or if
there are IDS failures. The current implementation of TANDI will alarm the network an
alyst for the abnormalities, whenever a network entity is recorded a normalized compro
mising score of 0. This indicator will allow the network analyst to examine the potential
source of insider threats, to identify coordinated attacks, or to revise the logical topology
model and the IDS setup.
3.4.5 Difference in Topology Results
Interestingly, the graphs presented in the previous two sections do not show any noticeable
trend between the three topologies of the small network. This could be a statistical anomaly,
but this suggested that the actual topology of the network is not significant in the accuracy
analysis. However, Figure 3.19 shows that topology 3 showed a significantly larger number
of threatened nodes. A larger set of attacks will need to be generated to determine the actual
effect of network connectivity on the prediction ability of
TANDI.
3.4.6 Coordinated Attacks
A single cyber attack can often originate from multiple sources on the Internet. This can be
the product ofmultiple hackers coordinated with each other, or several zombie clients being
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Figure 3.19: Average Percent Threatened on Small Network (Set 0)
controlled by one hacker. A zombie client is simply a computer that has been compromised
by a hacker that is used to execute another attack. This disguises the single attack from
being detected.
Such coordinated attacks will often be fragmented over multiple detected attacks. These
fragments, when evaluated by TANDI, would yield abnormalities, thus giving a poor de
tection performance for that attack. However, if the fragmented attacks were combined
into a single attack, some or all of the abnormalities would not exist, thus increasing the
prediction performance.





Recon, File Transfer Pm Escalation
Attack Description
Figure 3.20: Average Normalized Compromising Score of a Two Zombie Coordinated
Attack
Two such coordinated attacks were simulated in TANDI. Figure 3.20 illustrates the av
erage normalized compromising score of three attacks. In this example,
the hacker used
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two zombiemachines to execute the attack. The first zombie clientwas used to footprint the
network and transfer the password files after the external computers were actually compro
mised by the second zombie client. Attacks 1 and 2 represent one coordinated attack that
was detected as two separate attacks. Attack 3 is the combination of attacks 1 and 2. Note
how the average percentile rank increased when the fragmented attacks were combined.
This is because there were no abnormalities in the combined attack.
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Figure 3.21: Average Normalized Compromising Score of a Four Zombie Coordinated
Attack
Figure 3.21 shows another coordinated attack that was fragmented over four different
attacks. Attack 4 is the combination of the all of these fragmented attacks. Notice how this
combination does not improve the average normalized compromising score of all of the
attacks. However, it is significantly higher than the password transfer (PW Transfer) attack.
The first two attacks are simply footprinting of external computers, which is an expected
beginning to an attack. Hence, this was why attacks 0 and 1 had a high percentile rank.
Attack 2 was a compromise of an external computer with no associated reconnaissance
since it was performed by other zombie clients. Attack 3 is the compromise of an internal
computer, which is why the attack detection was so poor. The combination of the four
attacks eliminated the abnormalities and was able to better represent the overall coordinated
attack.
Future work will be devoted to a more in-depth analysis on how attacks can be com





The main contribution of this work was the development of a novel cyber attack threat as
sessment framework namedThreat Assessment ofNetworkData and Information (TANDI) .
TANDI is actually a combination of level 2 (situation assessment) and level 3 (threat as
sessment) data fusion. Besides being the first of its kind, the novelty of TANDI lies in
the separation of how (Potential Attack Sequence), where (Logical Topology), and what
(Information Graph) the hacker can attack. These three directed graphs can be developed
independent of each other and are fused together to determine critical network entities that
have been compromised, which is situation assessment. Based on this result, TANDI will
then try to predict the next critical entity that will be compromised by combining weights
assigned to nodes in each of the three graphs. These weights represent what has already
happened, and what is likely to happen next. They are assigned by the analyst based on
the criteria determined in the simulation discussion. The evaluation of a feature tree un
derlying each node in the information graph yields a threat score, which corresponds to the
likelihood that the entity represented in the information graph will be next compromised.
This prediction is the threat assessment. While only one feature tree structure was used in
this work, the structure could easily be changed to provide a different (and potentiallymore
accurate) evaluation of the weights. The separation ofhow, where, and what and the feature
tree make TANDI a flexible and scalable framework. Results also indicate that TANDI can
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be potentially used to detected coordinated attacks.
The second contribution involves the evaluation of the performance of a threat assess
ment framework. While there exist threat assessment frameworks in domains other than
computer networks, there is no common way to evaluate frameworks against each other.
This work provided several common metrics, such as average compromised percentile
rank, that can be used to compare frameworks over the same set of data. Other metrics,
such as percent threatened, can also be used to evaluate the overall threat of an incoming
attack. The use of the metrics was illustrated by evaluating TANDI over different network
topologies and cyber attacks with synthetic cyber attack data.
4.2 FutureWork
In this work, a novel framework for assessing the threat of incoming cyber attacks was
developed. Since this is the first framework for such an application, many extensions to
this work are worth pursuing. This section will discuss some of the possible extensions,
the underlying motivation for the extensions, and a preliminary analysis of how they may
be implemented.
4.2.1 More Simulation Data andMore Diverse Networks
One limitation of the simulation results were that they were simulated over artificially cre
ated cyber data on fictional networks. Simulation of TANDI over more diverse, realistic
networks with a larger set of cyber attack data would help to validate the results presented
in this work. A more extensive simulation framework would allow for a larger number of
attacks to be generated, which can help to validate some of the findings presented here.
To generate true data, a small network could be created and exposed to the Internet.
Attack data could be captured and input to an alert correlatorwhich then relays the detected
attacks to TANDI. One issue with this technique may be that the network contains no
important information for a hacker, so the hacker may decide to not bother compromising
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the other computers, which leads to incomplete attack data.
4.2.2 Integration with Existing Cyber Attack Detector
The framework ofTANDIwas developed in Java, but was only programmed for simulation.
More research needs to be conducted on how to integrate TANDIwith existing vulnerability
scanners to improve the automation of logical topology and information graph creation.
TANDI then needs to be integrated with an existing cyber attack detection system, such as
INFERD [28], to test its performance with actual attacks detected by such a system.
4.2.3 Inclusion of Sensor Location
The placement of IDS's can also be used to analyze the true threat of an incoming attack.
For example, supposed that a network contains two network IDS's. One IDS is located
external to the firewall, and the other is located behind the firewall. If an alert is reported
by the external EDS with a destination of an internal computer, but not reported by the
internal IDS, it is highly likely that the firewall filtered out the potentially malicious traffic,
thus no compromise could have taken place. Since TANDI currently ignores the location of
the sensors, the inclusion of sensor location could help to improve the accuracy of TANDI
by reducing the number of false positives.
4.2.4 Speed Optimization
TANDFs code is not optimized, so there are likely different optimizations to the code that
could increase the speed of TANDI. Since TANDI was simulated over only a small set of
data containing only a small subset of system logmessages and IDS alerts, it is possible that
a non-optimized implementation of TANDI may perform too slowly to be effective when
executed over a real computer network. This may prove to be necessary when TANDI is
integrated with an existing cyber attack detector.
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4.2.5 Dynamic PASs and Logical Topology
One assumption that TANDI makes is that the PAS and the logical topology are statically
defined. However, this is a very crude assumption and may not be realistic for most net
works. Since cyber attacks are constantly changing, IDSs must generate new alerts to
follow suit. Also, new servers or services could be deployed on the network, thus chang
ing the alerts that can be generated on the network. Therefore, the PAS should be able to
dynamically add new attacks as they are created.
The logical topology is primarily dictated by routing and firewall rules. It is likely
that a hacker may alter these rules, thus changing the logical topology. Also, the topology
may naturally change as certain links may go up or down. Therefore, TANDI should be
extended to allow the logical topology to change as the network changes.
It should be noted that these dynamic changes should not affect the way that TANDI
calculates it's threat scores and aggregate metrics. However, the dynamic nature of the
guidance template and logical topology will require research on how to dynamically change
these graphs to accurately reflect the changes.
4.2.6 New Combination Rules
TANDI currently only uses a crude summation ofweights to calculate threat scores. While
this has proven effective for the simulations, there may be a more accurate combination
rule of the weights. The feature tree, however, does provide an easy integration of new
combination rules as they are created. TANDI also currently only looks at the next steps.
It may be more beneficial to predictmore than one step in advance.
As discussed in Section 2.3.6, a drawback ofTANDI is that it does not take into account
the number of times an attack occurs on a single entity. This may or may not truly affect
the threat on that entity. Further research on this topic will indicate if there is a need to
factor in this multiplicity of attacks and, if so, how it will be implemented.
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4.2.7 Expansion ofMetrics
This work only focused on the six metrics for performance analysis. One of these metrics,
Average Compromising Score Percentile, did not provide any useful analysis over the sim
ulated data. There are likely to be other aggregate metrics that may give a better indication
of the overall threat of the attack or even the accuracy of the current model. As suggested
by [26] , these metrics should also be modified to include purity in addition to accuracy.
4.2.8 Detection of Coordinated Attacks
As shown in the simulations, a combination of coordinated attacks can potentially improve
the overall quality of threat assessment over the set of independent attacks. An
algorithm
to defragment these attacks into one coordinated attack would prove to be invaluable.
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